But that leaves the state of play among the parties the same as it was prior to the visit.
On his way back from Saudi Arabia, Erdogan explained his take to reporters. He said that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the most important countries in the region and they all have some responsibilities for the peace and welfare of the region. But he quickly added, “[in Egypt] a president who was elected with 52 percent of the vote [Mohammed Morsi] is imprisoned. There are nearly 18,000 political prisoners. These all show congestion [in Egypt’s democracy]. If there is not a controlled softening, it may cause a social outbreak in Egypt.”
The Turkish president answered a question about the Saudi position on that matter by briefly saying, “Saudi Arabia, of course, at the high level, wants to see peace between Turkey and Egypt, but there is no insistence.” According to the president, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are mostly on the same page on regional issues “despite diverging on Egypt.”
It is clear therefore that the state of play stands where we see three policy lines—Riyadh’s, Cairo’s and Ankara’s—intersecting in one important point: the position of Al Sissi on the question of the MB. By definition, this point of intersection has Riyadh standing in the middle between Cairo and Ankara. Erdogan wants a rehabilitation of the MB in Egypt. Al Sissi, according to his public statements, does not oppose the idea of reconciliation with the MB in principle, but he wants to first reduce the group to a level that does not represent any serious political or security threat to the regime. And Riyadh is cautiously intermediating between the two leaders.
Before looking at the prospects of getting the three regional powers to overcome the obstacle explained by Erdogan’s statements, it is worthwhile to examine how the MBs themselves see this dynamic.
The group’s morale was raised to unrealistic levels by two moves. First, by Washington’s official meetings with some of its members, and second, by some Saudi public statements indicating a change in Riyadh’s previous policies related to the organization.
The MB’s general strategy is to play all possible foreign cards while betting on two parallel paths inside Egypt: The first is the condition of the Egyptian economy which is indeed going through some very difficult times. The second is the effects of their low intensity terrorism campaign inside Egypt.
In the recent few weeks, the organization intensified its campaign of amateurish bombings of banks, foreign and national companies and government targets. The objective is to jeopardize a major economic conference to be held this month in Sharm Al Shaikh. Bombings are also targeting tourist destinations in order to continue depriving Egypt of this valuable source of hard currency.
Jamal Heshmat, one of the top leaders of the MB currently living in Turkey said on his Facebook page on March 4th that the Sharm Al Shaikh conference will be damaging to Egypt, “and we all have to escalate our rejection of it, particularly since many Jewish companies are participating.”
In point of fact, the MBs want to push Egypt to another public revolt—this time against Al Sissi- by making any economic recovery more difficult. Reaching that point will not be easy. The Egyptian population seems to be holding to their rejection of the organization and thereby is guaranteeing Al Sissi some additional time to put the country together. Al Sissi replaced his Minister of Interior, which hopefully will be a prelude to a smarter security policy and more sensitivity to public opinion and the rule of law.
All things considered, Cairo does not seem ready to make essential concessions to the MB, and neither do the MBs seem ready to descend from the high tree that they climbed during the last few months.
This dilemma will certainly slow the possibility of advancing towards the construction of the new security axis proposed by both Riyadh and Washington at a moment when the region most needs a quick and fresh stabilizing regional force able to control its continuous slide to chaos.
It is thus clear that the internal situation in Egypt is one of the most stubborn obstacles on the road to implementing this new regional security concept. That fact, clear from Erdogan statements and other reports, should suggest a different role for the Obama Administration.
The Administration is obviously still attached to its previous policy of dialogue and measured engagement with the MB. While no one is suggesting that Washington cut its ties to the group, the content of the administration’s policy in that regard should be subjected to a sober review.
For example, Washington should condemn the group’s terrorist activities, their zero-sum game, and their perception about their role as a political power (that of gradually moving, if ever governing Egypt, towards rule by their undemocratic interpretation of Shari’a). The objective of any such timely review of the US policy towards the MB is to help the organization lower its ceiling of expectations and abandon its current path which is damaging both to itself and to Egypt at this sensitive juncture.
Saudi Arabia should as well pressure the MBs to develop a practical version of a reconciliation plan. And Cairo must give more consideration to the carrots instead of always using a heavy stick. The Egyptian government should make very clear what the benefits of reconciliation with the group could be. The new Minister of Interior should be bluntly told that the law should be respected.
Riyadh is pursuing its usual quiet diplomacy to overcome the obstacles in the road to the regional security concept jointly planned with the US. We believe there is a chance of success here, provided that the Obama administration plays a role in the heavy lifting required. Aid packages to Cairo and quiet pressure on the MB are called for by virtue of the dynamics mentioned above.
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