King Abdullah II of Jordan met Al Sissi on February 26th, following a short visit the King had made to Riyadh the previous day. When Abdullah arrived at night to Cairo, a prompt meeting with Al Sissi was held. A few hours later he left Cairo back to Amman. Mission accomplished.
But what was this mission exactly?
In its direct sense, it was clearing the clogged pipe between Cairo and Riyadh. There has indeed been some tension in the relations as became evident from the results of the meeting between their foreign ministers in Paris on February 25th.
While inviting Al Sissi to Riyadh will help achieve a better understanding of the unresolved issues between the two sides, these issues are pretty tough on their own. But it is first necessary to shed some light on the context for all these diplomatic moves (Erdogan-Al Sissi-King Abdullah II-Saudi Arabia) as a way to see the dilemma that Egypt has faced in the last couple of months.
The general framework that organized all the intensive diplomatic activities was the emerging concept of creating a regional security doctrine accompanied by a multi-nation military force.
The US is the real author of this concept. It is formed as a development from the combination of the unwillingness to involve US military forces “en masse,” the opposition of America’s public opinion to waging wars in the Middle East, the need to have an active force challenging the rise of terrorist groups and a creative implementation of Joint Chiefs of Staff head, General Martin Dempsey’s “partnership” concept where allies should shoulder the burden of protecting their own neighborhoods.
From Washington’s perspective, the threat of the expansion of terrorist groups in the region is paramount. But neither does the US look favorably on Iranian expansionist policies—with or without a nuclear deal. The organizing principle for both goals is that it is necessary to return to a sustainable stabilization strategy. This would require reducing tensions between regional players and laying down a new security concept based on aligning the GCC, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey to explore available paths for working together to implement this new regional security doctrine.
But seen from the perspective of regional players – until recently – the two threats, ISIL and Iran’s regional ambitions, had a different interaction. The Jihadists were effective in preventing Iran from taking over all of Iraq and Syria and the two threats could be played against each other. The view of the two sides, the US and the Gulf countries, were conflicting in structure, evaluations and methods.
Two qualitative turning points took place in the dynamics of the dispute between the US and Saudi Arabia that has dragged on for over three years. The first was the sweeping expansion of ISIL in Iraq last summer. The second was the passing of Saudi King Abdullah in January which was followed by a purge of all his top aides responsible for the previous policies.
The emerging new leadership in Saudi Arabia viewed the threats to the Kingdom’s national security in terms different from those of the previous Saudi Administration and closely identified with the US perspective, albeit with a slight skew. This new Saudi leadership redefined the threat and the role of Jihadists in the region based on different evaluations. Both Iran and Islamic radicalism were viewed as threats that should be confronted, together, simultaneously. The tactic of playing the Jihadists as a balancing weight to the Iranian threat was not only taken to be ineffective but also to be too dangerous to preserve.
This change in the official view of the Saudis allowed a higher synchronization with the US. The difference between each view, now dramatically reduced, could be summarized as follows: While Washington gives priority to curbing the rise of Jihadism in the Middle East, it sees the Iranians’ role as positive insofar as they are fighting ISIL, but unhelpful in their regional ambitions. The Saudis give absolute priority to the Iranian threat but feel that the threat of Jihadism might not be as long term as they thought it was under King Abdullah. In any case, it was clear that there was enough of a common ground to build a joint approach, and enough assets and connections to build a smooth channel of communications to patiently implement this strategy.
The strategy, as mentioned, was based on getting the regional powers, including Egypt, Turkey and Qatar, to coordinate a common approach to their regional security problems with a central role for the US. But this required solving two tough issues: the Qatar-Egypt confrontation and Al Sissi’s policy of relentless crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
The reason for this second objective was clear all along. The MB provides a popular and religious component in any strategy to increase the regional immunity to Jihadism. We will discuss the validity of this argument in a future issue, but for the time being, it suffices to say that the Egyptian government saw this whole exercise from a different perspective. Therefore, while Saudi-US ties were warming up, Egyptian-US ties were going in the opposite direction.
In a practical sense, Cairo saw that the immediate threat to Egypt’s stability was neither ISIL nor Iran, but the MB. The fact that both the US and the new leadership in Riyadh incorporated the MB into their joint concept, then asked Egypt to join in, stunned the Egyptian president. The US-Saudi concept not only opposed Egypt’s perception of threat sources, it also included the main source of these threats as an ally, then asked Egypt to join the line, side by side with those who it considers its main concern.
Egypt was bluntly asked to change its policy of cracking down on the MB. Furthermore, Egypt was asked to reach a deal with them and include them in the political process. Without such a change, potential problems can occur on the track of Cairo-Riyadh ties. This was particularly menacing to Al Sissi who is faced with substantial economic challenges and who depends on the Gulf States’ financial aid to survive.
The conditions related to the MB were not the only bitter poison pill. For, in order to improve relations with the MB and to play a role in the new regional concept side by side with Qatar and Turkey, Egypt has to give up its demands that Doha and Ankara stop helping the organization. Both Qatar and Turkey have exchanged barbs with Cairo for almost a year.
Cairo quickly offered a counter initiative based on forming a regional military-security force as well, but without Qatar and Turkey, hoping it could slow the momentum of the alternative US-Saudi concept. But Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal explained to his Egyptian counterpart in Paris that the Egyptian idea will not work so far as its regional base is not expanded. The meaning of expanding the regional base was clear enough.
Developments in real time were going in a direction different from the one eyed by the Egyptian President. Qatar, sensing the new change in the direction of the wind, allowed one of the leaders of the MB, Mohamed Abdul Maqsoud, to return to Doha under a thin humanitarian pretext three months after kicking him out. Egyptian media resumed its attacks against Doha. Cairo officially accused the Qataris of supporting terrorism after the massacre of 20 Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya last month. Doha responded by recalling the Qatari ambassador from Cairo. Saudi Arabia entered the ring with a clear change in its tone towards both Al Sissi and the MB, albeit in different directions. The Egyptian president was not invited to Saudi Arabia since the death of King Abdullah, and his crackdown on the MB was described as “unsustainable and risky.” Riyadh hinted as well that it will soon change its ambassador in Cairo, Ahmed Al Qatan, who was a close friend of the regime in Cairo and of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and who played a role in supporting Al Sissi.
It was almost unbelievable. Within only less than two months, the whole dynamic in the region shifted a great deal. Instead of the expected advance of Egyptian–Qatari reconciliation on Cairo’s terms and at the expense of the MB, Cairo was asked to dismantle every single piece of its strategy. But Al Sissi had little room to maneuver.
We can read the outcome of Al Sissi’s dilemma from what is happening now on the ground. We see now a gradual advance by a reluctant Cairo to a deal with the MB. Previous channels of dialogue, that were shut by the regime, which even arrested the interlocutors in some cases, are reopened. Egyptian authorities offered the MB financial compensation for the families of the victims of the massacre of Raba’a Square in 2013 in return for closing the page of the effects of this massacre (in accordance with an old Islamic tradition). The offer was made in secret negotiations with one of the organization’s imprisoned leaders, Saad Al Katatney.
The whole proposition of Qatar reconciliation has had its content changed by the change in the Saudi strategy. The time frame between the meeting of Al Sissi and the Qatari Special Envoy Sheikh Mohammed Abdul Rahman last December, on one hand, and the moment of calling back Doha’s ambassador in Cairo, on the other, has witnessed a total change. It is just a manifestation of how central the role of late King Abdullah was in the previous regional configuration.
Riyadh is confining its maneuver to fulfill its share of the new partnership with the US to its usual quiet diplomacy. It negotiated with the MB in Yemen (Al Islah party) in Riyadh last month, about how best to confront the Iranian-backed rebels (Al Houthi followers). It negotiates secretly with the Egyptian MB in London and in Riyadh.
It has been clear all along that Egypt’s economy does not provide Al Sissi with a long enough leash to stand, almost alone, in the face of the new plan or even to shape it along his terms. His role was indeed shaped somewhere else. But was it? Al Sissi did not run out of cards yet. It is still possible that the new plan will eventually face some surprising obstacle by a reluctant and hard headed president. The whisper in Cairo is that Al Sissi is well aware of the whole dynamics around him and that he is still determined to go his way. One thing is sure: it will not be easy to convince the tough president to do what is required from him.
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