On Tuesday, President Barack Obama met with King Salman, one of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud’s sons. Much has changed in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. But the elements that drove FDR and all of his successors to maintain and strengthen those ties—oil and regional stability–are still in place.
The United States and Saudi Arabia never shared common values. The arrest and flogging of the liberal Saudi blogger Raif Badawi attest to that. But they do share common interests: the adhesive that can bind nations together.
Yet all is not well in the House of Saud’s view of its traditional ally. The Saudis are unhappy with the Obama administration’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran; they have not forgiven Washington for what they regard as Mr. Obama’s willingness to help ease Egypt’s longtime leader Hosni Mubarak from power; and they are white-hot angry at the U.S. refusal to take on–and out—Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s key ally who daily slaughters their fellow Sunnis.
Despite all this, in the wake of King Abdullah’s passing last week, the U.S.-Saudi relationship is on an upswing. President Obama’s decision to cut short his trip to India and meet with the new Saudi king underscores that, for all its anomalies and contradictions, the U.S.-Saudi relationship is too big to fail. Here are three reasons why.
Crude diplomacy: The U.S. may be weaning itself off of Arab hydrocarbons, but the rest of the world isn’t. And disruption in any given oil-producing country can roil oil and financial markets worldwide, including here at home. The Saudis remain the key swing producer; and the U.S. must not only remain close to the Saudis but–in the mold of George H.W. Bush’s decision to push Saddam Hussein‘s forces out of Kuwait–a putative protector too.
Jihadis on the march: Terror threats are the only thing that possibly trumps oil when it comes to U.S. interests. And the rise of Islamic State; al-Qaeda’s resurgence in the Arabian peninsula; and the growing terror sanctuaries in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria mean that the U.S. needs local allies. Among the Arabs, the Saudis are the most stable and reliable in the region. They have excellent intel, financial resources, and counter-terrorism capacities. Bordering Yemen is both a liability and an advantage–and gives the Saudis rare access at a critical time: The U.S. needs Sunni allies in its coalition to counter ISIS.
Kings forever: It’s a cruel irony that in the wake of the Arab spring of 2011, in which the old order in many countries was boldly overturned in the name of freedom and even democracy, only authoritarian kings, sheiks, and emirs have survived. Leaders of Persian Gulf states have money to coopt and preempt radicalism and Islamic legitimacy to secure their rule; and they are less cruel and extractive than Saddam Hussein, the Assads, Moammar Gaddhafi, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, or Hosni Mubarak ever were. And in the lands of the Arabs, the Saudis in particular offer a rare stability that the U.S. can’t afford to ignore: We may support an Arab spring in Egypt. But we don’t want one in Saudi Arabia. Great powers can afford to be inconsistent and hypocritical.
The bells of change may ultimately toll for the kings of the Middle East. But not today. And that’s why Barack Obama, the young U.S. president who wanted to be on the right side of history and democratic change, finds himself making nice to the aging undemocratic son of the king who captivated FDR. Mr. Obama’s trope of hope and change aside, in the Middle East, stability is rare–and it is king, too.
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Aaron David Miller is a vice president at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and most recently the author of “The End of Greatness: Why America Can’t Have (and Doesn’t Want) Another Great President.” http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/01/27/obama-in-saudi-arabia-stability-is-king/