Opinion ISIS Is Only One Piece of Syria’s Extremist Puzzle

ISIS Is Only One Piece of Syria’s Extremist Puzzle

-

 

Here are five major takeaways from the study of the rebels' ideology and objectives:

 

* Sixty percent of the major Syrian rebel groups are Islamic extremists. Of the 48 groups analyzed, about a third, or roughly 100,000 fighters, identify with ideologies similar to those claimed by ISIS. The share grows to 60% when those groups whose objective is to replace Bashar al-Assad and create a polity in which Islamic law prevails are included. Only about a fifth of the groups surveyed ascribe to an ideology that is ambiguous or undefined. Those groups usually identified with the Free Syrian Army are driven more by objectives such as getting rid of Mr. Assad than by any core belief system. In short, believers are the majority.

 

* Unless Mr. Assad goes, the war in Syria will continue–and escalate. Of the groups surveyed, 90% see ousting Mr. Assad as the key goal. Thirty-eight percent shared the goal of defeating Islamic State. (The report noted that objectives overlap and the percentages do not add up to 100%.) These findings suggest that the Russian policy of supporting Mr. Assad is at odds with sentiments on the ground and that those sentiments are also in conflict with the direction of U.S. policy. Getting rid of Mr. Assad was the Obama administration's stated goal from the start. But U.S. concentration on ISIS and efforts to engage Russia and Iran in a diplomatic process suggest a softening. Meanwhile, the perception among Islamist groups is that Washington is not on their side and may sell them out.

 

* The report faults efforts to distinguish between radical and moderate rebel groups. Across Syria, Islamists of varying persuasions fight alongside non-ideological groups against Mr. Assad and ISIS. In the southwest, for example, an al-Qaeda-led coalition mobilizes Islamists, Salafis, and a variety of others with more ambiguous ideologies. Earlier this year, Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda group, led the way while Western armed rebels provided fire support. Kurdish separatists and Syrian nationalists also fight ISIS together. The good news is that these groups allow objectives, not ideology, to drive collaboration. The bad news is that it's hard to draw a line between extremists and moderates.

 

* Defeating ISIS will leave Islamists in charge. The report says that of the 96,000 fighters distributed among the 16 Salafi groups, there are least 65,000 fighters in non-ISIS groups ready to assume center stage should ISIS be defeated. Four of these 16 groups are large enough to hold territory.

 

All this leaves me thinking that the known Islamists in Syria are like an iceberg. ISIS–the manifestation of the jihadis– is the visible tip, but the bulk of the Syrian opposition is like a larger mass lurking below the waterline. Groups with extremist orientations and ideologies are waiting to inherit Syria if ISIS falls. The longer the conflict drags on, the more motivated and determined these groups–having done much of the fighting–will be to ensure that their vision of Syria shapes the end game.

 

On the one hand, all this validates Vladimir Putin's notion that some of the opposition groups are as bad as ISIS; on the other hand, by supporting Mr. Assad, the Russians–and, to an extent, U.S. acquiescence–only contribute to radicalization and anger at the West. Defeating ISIS won't address the problem of the jihadis, the report found, unless "it is accompanied by an intellectual and theological defeat of the pernicious ideology that drives it."

 

_______________________________________

 

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/12/22/isis-is-only-one-piece-of-syrias-extremist-puzzle/

 

?s=96&d=mm&r=g ISIS Is Only One Piece of Syria’s Extremist Puzzle

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here

You might also likeRELATED
Recommended to you

 

Here are five major takeaways from the study of the rebels' ideology and objectives:

 

* Sixty percent of the major Syrian rebel groups are Islamic extremists. Of the 48 groups analyzed, about a third, or roughly 100,000 fighters, identify with ideologies similar to those claimed by ISIS. The share grows to 60% when those groups whose objective is to replace Bashar al-Assad and create a polity in which Islamic law prevails are included. Only about a fifth of the groups surveyed ascribe to an ideology that is ambiguous or undefined. Those groups usually identified with the Free Syrian Army are driven more by objectives such as getting rid of Mr. Assad than by any core belief system. In short, believers are the majority.

 

* Unless Mr. Assad goes, the war in Syria will continue–and escalate. Of the groups surveyed, 90% see ousting Mr. Assad as the key goal. Thirty-eight percent shared the goal of defeating Islamic State. (The report noted that objectives overlap and the percentages do not add up to 100%.) These findings suggest that the Russian policy of supporting Mr. Assad is at odds with sentiments on the ground and that those sentiments are also in conflict with the direction of U.S. policy. Getting rid of Mr. Assad was the Obama administration's stated goal from the start. But U.S. concentration on ISIS and efforts to engage Russia and Iran in a diplomatic process suggest a softening. Meanwhile, the perception among Islamist groups is that Washington is not on their side and may sell them out.

 

* The report faults efforts to distinguish between radical and moderate rebel groups. Across Syria, Islamists of varying persuasions fight alongside non-ideological groups against Mr. Assad and ISIS. In the southwest, for example, an al-Qaeda-led coalition mobilizes Islamists, Salafis, and a variety of others with more ambiguous ideologies. Earlier this year, Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda group, led the way while Western armed rebels provided fire support. Kurdish separatists and Syrian nationalists also fight ISIS together. The good news is that these groups allow objectives, not ideology, to drive collaboration. The bad news is that it's hard to draw a line between extremists and moderates.

 

* Defeating ISIS will leave Islamists in charge. The report says that of the 96,000 fighters distributed among the 16 Salafi groups, there are least 65,000 fighters in non-ISIS groups ready to assume center stage should ISIS be defeated. Four of these 16 groups are large enough to hold territory.

 

All this leaves me thinking that the known Islamists in Syria are like an iceberg. ISIS–the manifestation of the jihadis– is the visible tip, but the bulk of the Syrian opposition is like a larger mass lurking below the waterline. Groups with extremist orientations and ideologies are waiting to inherit Syria if ISIS falls. The longer the conflict drags on, the more motivated and determined these groups–having done much of the fighting–will be to ensure that their vision of Syria shapes the end game.

 

On the one hand, all this validates Vladimir Putin's notion that some of the opposition groups are as bad as ISIS; on the other hand, by supporting Mr. Assad, the Russians–and, to an extent, U.S. acquiescence–only contribute to radicalization and anger at the West. Defeating ISIS won't address the problem of the jihadis, the report found, unless "it is accompanied by an intellectual and theological defeat of the pernicious ideology that drives it."

 

_______________________________________

 

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/12/22/isis-is-only-one-piece-of-syrias-extremist-puzzle/